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On April 23, 2009, the New York City Department of 
Health and Mental Hygiene (DOHMH) was notiﬁ   ed of a 
school outbreak of respiratory illness; 2 days later the in-
fection was identiﬁ  ed as pandemic (H1N1) 2009. This was 
the ﬁ  rst major outbreak of the illness in the United States. 
To guide decisions on the public health response, the DO-
HMH used active hospital-based surveillance and then en-
hanced passive reporting to collect data on demographics, 
risk conditions, and clinical severity. This surveillance iden-
tiﬁ  ed 996 hospitalized patients with conﬁ  rmed or probable 
pandemic (H1N1) 2009 virus infection from April 24 to July 
7; ﬁ  fty percent lived in high-poverty neighborhoods. Nearly 
half were <18 years of age. Surveillance data were critical 
in guiding the DOHMH response. The DOHMH experience 
during this outbreak illustrates the need for the capacity to 
rapidly expand and modify surveillance to adapt to chang-
ing conditions. 
O
n April 23, 2009, a nurse from a high school in New 
York City (NYC) called the Department of Health and 
Mental Hygiene (DOHMH) to report an outbreak of respi-
ratory illness (1). The cause of the outbreak was rapidly 
conﬁ  rmed to be inﬂ  uenza A pandemic (H1N1) 2009 virus. 
This outbreak was detected just a few days after initial re-
ports of mild disease caused by pandemic (H1N1) 2009 vi-
rus in California and Texas (2,3) and at the same time as an 
outbreak of severe respiratory disease associated with pan-
demic (H1N1) 2009 virus in Mexico (4). Information about 
the clinical severity and transmission characteristics of this 
new inﬂ  uenza virus was limited. Given preliminary media 
reports about the Mexican outbreak and concern that NYC 
might also experience widespread severe disease, DOHMH 
launched a large-scale public health response.
Before the spring of 2009, DOHMH routine surveil-
lance systems for inﬂ   uenza included 1) syndromic sur-
veillance for medication sales, school absenteeism, and 
emergency department visits for inﬂ  uenza-like illness (ILI) 
(5,6); 2) electronic laboratory reporting of conﬁ  rmed cases 
from commercial and hospital laboratories; 3) active sur-
veillance of all NYC virology laboratories to determine the 
weekly number of specimens submitted for inﬂ  uenza test-
ing and the percentage of those positive; 4) typing samples 
of inﬂ  uenza isolates obtained from patients in NYC hos-
pitals at the DOHMH Public Health Laboratory (PHL); 
5) enhanced passive surveillance for pediatric inﬂ  uenza 
deaths; 6) monitoring trends in inﬂ  uenza and pneumonia-
related mortality through the DOHMH Vital Registry; and 
7) monitoring outpatient ILI through the Centers for Dis-
ease Control and Prevention (CDC; Atlanta, GA, USA) 
Inﬂ  uenza-like Illness Surveillance Network (7), a sentinel 
network through which providers reported weekly on the 
proportion of ILI in their practices during inﬂ  uenza season. 
The DOHMH had also created a plan for local response to a 
potential inﬂ  uenza pandemic, including enhanced surveil-
lance to guide public health ofﬁ  cials in determining how to 
prioritize use of antiviral agents and vaccines (8). Surveil-
lance data could also inform community control measures, 
such as school closures. Proposed surveillance strategies in 
this plan focused on mechanisms for monitoring trends in 
hospitalizations and deaths, but not necessarily for trying to 
count every severe case. Methods were also proposed for 
obtaining more detailed clinical and epidemiologic data for 
a sample of cases.
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The DOHMH also has an incident command system 
(ICS), an agency-wide structure for addressing and re-
sponding to emergencies that is different from the usual 
DOHMH structure. Divided into 10 sections, the ICS is 
led by an incident commander who reports directly to the 
Commissioner of Health (9). All DOHMH employees are 
assigned to a section within the ICS and can be called on 
to assist their section upon activation of the system. In a 
public health emergency, the Surveillance and Epidemiol-
ogy Section establishes and conducts surveillance to assess 
the illness and deaths associated with the event and con-
ducts any needed epidemiologic studies to guide the public 
health response. ICS activation provides surge capacity by 
increasing the workforce available to conduct surveillance 
or epidemiologic activities beyond the staff members who 
are normally responsible for the speciﬁ  c disease or public 
health issues involved in the emergency.
We describe some of the surveillance methods used in 
the investigation of pandemic (H1N1) 2009 in NYC from 
April to July 2009. DOHMH investigated the high school 
outbreak (1,10), and set up an enhanced citywide surveil-
lance system to track the scope and severity of infections. 
The agency also prioritized identiﬁ   cation and diagnos-
tic testing of patients with severe or fatal cases of ILI in 
hospitals or clusters of those with ILI in schools and other 
congregate settings; this surveillance was essential because 
evidence of severe pandemic (H1N1) 2009 would have 
prompted more aggressive public health control measures. 
In addition, because surveillance of cases in hospitalized 
patients, and particularly of fatal cases, was an important 
part of this investigation, we provide an overview of epide-
miologic ﬁ  ndings among hospitalized patients.
Methods
On Saturday, April 25, 2009, when preliminary labora-
tory results suggested a likely pandemic (H1N1) 2009 out-
break at high school A, the DOHMH activated its ICS and 
initially mobilized >200 staff members for a large-scale 
public health response (later adding additional staff). From 
April 25 through May 8, the agency also expanded its hours 
of operation to 7 days a week from 9:00 AM to 9:00 PM; staff 
worked in shifts to cover the extended hours.
The ICS was deactivated on May 8, since minimal 
evidence existed of community circulation of pandemic 
(H1N1) 2009. By mid-May, however, DOHMH noticed 
an increase in ILI, especially in schoolchildren. On May 
17, 2009, the ﬁ  rst NYC death from pandemic (H1N1) 2009 
virus occurred. In response to these developments and to 
increasing reports of hospitalized case-patients, DOHMH 
reactivated its ICS on May 19. This second activation con-
tinued until July 7, 2009.
Enhanced Citywide Surveillance
Active Surveillance for Critically Ill Case-Patients
Starting April 26, the DOHMH conducted active city-
wide surveillance in hospital intensive care units (ICUs) for 
severe, unexplained, febrile respiratory illnesses (deﬁ  ned 
as a temperature >100.4°F (>38°C) and pneumonia, acute 
respiratory distress syndrome, or respiratory distress (as 
diagnosed by clinicians) with no known cause. DOHMH 
staff contacted all 57 NYC hospitals with medical or pedi-
atric ICUs daily by telephone and queried the clinician in 
charge of the ICU that day to determine the number of pa-
tients with conditions that met the surveillance deﬁ  nition. 
Active ICU surveillance was discontinued on May 8 since 
few cases of severe illness were being identiﬁ  ed.
Enhanced Passive Surveillance for Hospitalized 
Case-Patients with Noncritical Illness 
To ascertain the number of hospitalized patients 
with pandemic (H1N1) 2009 outside of the ICU setting, 
DOHMH relied on enhanced passive surveillance. Provid-
ers were notiﬁ  ed of reporting requirements through the 
NYC Health Alert Network, which sends faxes and email 
alerts to 29,000 clinicians and healthcare institutions in 
NYC, and through daily conference calls with all NYC 
acute care facilities. DOHMH set up a dedicated NYC tele-
phone access line to triage provider calls. Providers were 
initially asked to report any hospitalized patients outside 
of the ICU setting with severe, unexplained, febrile respi-
ratory illnesses (as deﬁ  ned above). However, because of 
the increasing number of calls and limited staff and labora-
tory testing capacity at the NYC PHL, beginning on May 
12, providers were asked to only report non-ICU cases of 
severe, febrile respiratory illness if initial test results were 
positive for inﬂ  uenza A virus by enzyme immunoassay, 
PCR, direct ﬂ  uorescent antibody test, or virus culture at the 
hospital laboratory. However, DOHMH continued to ac-
cept reports on all patients with febrile respiratory illness 
who were in the ICU or were receiving ventilation, regard-
less of inﬂ  uenza testing status.
Active Laboratory Surveillance
During the week after the recognition of pandemic 
(H1N1) 2009 in NYC (April 25–30), DOHMH actively 
collected specimens from laboratories chosen to be geo-
graphically representative of the city to determine whether 
evidence existed of community circulation of the pandemic 
virus that was not associated with the outbreak at the high 
school. Five sentinel laboratories were selected and asked 
to submit 1–3 inﬂ  uenza A virus–positive specimens from 
the previous 2 days to the NYC PHL to test for pandemic 
(H1N1) 2009 virus.
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Case-Patient Interviews
During the ﬁ  rst 3 weeks of the outbreak, DOHMH 
staff attempted telephone interviews of all patients (or their 
proxies) who had conﬁ  rmed pandemic (H1N1) 2009 for 
demographic, epidemiologic, and clinical information. Pro-
viders of care for hospitalized case-patients were also inter-
viewed to gather information about patient demographics, 
underlying conditions, and clinical course of illness. Once 
community circulation in NYC was established, DOHMH 
stopped interviewing patients about possible risk of expo-
sure (e.g., travel to Mexico, school attendance).
Surveillance for Deaths
To track pandemic (H1N1) 2009–related deaths, 
DOHMH asked that hospitals report any fatal cases of un-
explained, acute, febrile respiratory illness to DOHMH and 
to the Ofﬁ  ce of the Chief Medical Examiner (OCME). The 
OCME collected specimens and performed autopsies on 
any patient whose death was preceded by a sudden, unex-
plained, febrile respiratory illness, as well as for all pediat-
ric patients who died with clinically compatible illness in 
which there was a positive inﬂ  uenza test result, a sudden 
unexplained death thought to be due to a natural cause, or 
death of a child from an unknown febrile respiratory ill-
ness. If no testing results for pandemic (H1N1) 2009 virus 
were available from the hospital, OCME collected a post-
mortem nasopharyngeal swab specimen for inﬂ  uenza di-
agnostic testing at PHL. In addition, the dataset of patients 
who tested positive for pandemic (H1N1) 2009 virus was 
matched weekly with the NYC Vital Records database of 
recent deaths in NYC to ensure that no pandemic (H1N1) 
2009 deaths were missed.
Laboratory Methods
DOHMH physicians screened reported potential cases 
to determine if they met testing criteria, and if so, nasopha-
ryngeal specimens were requested. Recognizing the need to 
prioritize PHL resources for hospitalized patients and those 
with fatal cases, DOHMH speciﬁ  cally requested that clini-
cians not test patients with mild ILI unless the patient was 
part of a reported cluster in a school, jail, nursing home, or 
other congregate setting.
Specimens were initially tested for inﬂ  uenza A or B 
viruses, and then, if positive for inﬂ  uenza A, were further 
tested for seasonal inﬂ  uenza A virus (H1N1 or H3N1) by 
using the QIAamp Viral RNA manual extraction method 
(QIAGEN, Valencia, CA, USA) and real-time reverse 
transcription–PCR by using the Cepheid SmartCycler 
(Cepheid, Sunnyvale, CA, USA). Initially, specimens that 
were positive for inﬂ  uenza A virus, but not seasonal inﬂ  u-
enza A virus subtypes H1N1 or H3N1, and suspected to be 
pandemic (H1N1) 2009 virus were sent to CDC for conﬁ  r-
mation. Then, on May 11, the PHL started to perform the 
CDC Inﬂ  uenza Virus Real-time reverse transcription–PCR 
detection and characterization panel for pandemic (H1N1) 
2009 virus on all nonseasonal inﬂ  uenza A specimens by 
using a high-throughput system including an automated 
extraction system and ABI7500 Fast-Dx (Life Technolo-
gies, Carlsbad, CA, USA). Beginning on May 20, PHL per-
formed the same CDC assay on all inﬂ  uenza specimens by 
using the same high throughput system.
A conﬁ  rmed case of pandemic (H1N1) 2009 was de-
ﬁ  ned as a person who had a specimen that was PCR posi-
tive for pandemic (H1N1) 2009 virus. A probable case was 
deﬁ  ned as a patient with nonsubtypeable inﬂ  uenza A virus 
infection for whom conﬁ  rmatory testing was not conducted. 
Conﬁ  rmatory inﬂ  uenza testing was performed at PHL, CDC, 
or the New York State Wadsworth Center Laboratory.
Analytic Methods
We analyzed surveillance data to describe NYC resi-
dents who were hospitalized with pandemic (H1N1) 2009 
in NYC from the start of the ﬁ  rst ICS activation to the end of 
the second activation (April 24–July 7). We also calculated 
pandemic (H1N1) 2009 rates by dividing the number of 
conﬁ  rmed and probable cases among hospitalized patients 
by NYC population counts from the US Census 2000. We 
examined rates by demographic characteristics of hospital-
ized patients and performed direct age-adjustment by using 
weights based on US Census 2000 (11).
Additionally, patient poverty level was assessed by 
linking ZIP code of residence with income and population 
data from the US Census 2000. We deﬁ  ned neighborhoods 
using the United Hospital Fund (UHF) designation, which 
aggregates adjoining ZIP codes to create 42 NYC neighbor-
hoods (12). We then created a neighborhood poverty vari-
able by categorizing UHF neighborhoods into tertiles (low-, 
medium-, and high-poverty neighborhoods) based on the 
percentage of residents living <200% of the federal poverty 
level, according to the US Census 2000, and calculated rates 
for conﬁ  rmed and probable pandemic (H1N1) 2009 cases 
by UHF neighborhood poverty status. Poverty data were 
available for 993 of the 996 persons who were hospitalized 
with conﬁ  rmed or probable pandemic (H1N1) 2009.
For all analyses, signiﬁ  cance was determined at p<0.05. 
All statistical analyses were conducted by using SAS 9.2 
(SAS Institute Inc., Cary, NC, USA).
Results
Hospitalizations
During April 24–May 7, corresponding to the ﬁ  rst ICS 
activation, 15 patients with conﬁ  rmed or probable cases 
of pandemic (H1N1) 2009 were hospitalized (median stay 
was 1 day). At that time, most cases were linked to the 
high school inﬂ  uenza A outbreak and only 2 case-patients 
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reported travel to Mexico. No deaths had been reported. 
Since few cases of severe illness had occurred, the ICS was 
deactivated, and staff who would normally be involved in 
communicable disease outbreak investigations continued 
to monitor pandemic (H1N1) 2009 activity.
By July 7, the end of the second ICS activation, 996 
patients had been hospitalized. The distribution of 996 hos-
pitalized case-patients (929 conﬁ  rmed and 67 probable) 
over time, including the increased incidence in late May, 
can be seen in Figure 1. From April 24 through July 7, 
the estimated age-adjusted rate of conﬁ  rmed and probable 
pandemic (H1N1) 2009 hospitalizations was 12.3/100,000 
NYC residents (95% conﬁ  dence interval [CI] 11.8–13.4). 
The rate among patients <4 years of age (40.9/100,000, 
95% CI 35.6-46.3) was almost 7× that among those >65 
years of age (6.0/100,000, 95% CI 4.5–7.7) (Table). The 
estimated age-adjusted rate of pandemic (H1N1) 2009 
hospitalized patients in high-poverty neighborhoods (18.4/
100,000, 95% CI 16.8–20.1) was signiﬁ  cantly higher than 
that in low-poverty neighborhoods (8.9/100,000, 95% CI 
7.6–10.4) (Table; Figure 2).
Deaths
The ﬁ  rst NYC death occurred on May 17. Additional 
information about NYC pandemic (H1N1) 2009 deaths has 
been published elsewhere (13). 
Discussion
The experience of NYC with pandemic (H1N1) 2009 
demonstrates the need for ﬂ  exibility in surveillance ap-
proaches and ongoing modiﬁ  cation of surveillance meth-
ods to best respond to a changing public health emergency. 
Although DOHMH had not planned to do such intensive 
active and enhanced surveillance during an inﬂ  uenza pan-
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Figure 1. Hospitalized patients with conﬁ  rmed or probable pandemic 
(H1N1) 2009, by date of onset, New York, New York, USA, April 24–
July 7, 2009. Onset date was missing for 98 patients with conﬁ  rmed 
pandemic (H1N1) 2009 and 16 with probable pandemic (H1N1) 
2009. Surveillance data as of August 25, 2009.
Table. Demographic characteristics of patients hospitalized with confirmed or probable pandemic (H1N1) 2009, New York, NY, USA,
April 24–July 7, 2009* 
Characteristic
No. (%) patients with  
confirmed or probable  
pandemic (H1N1) 2009 
% All residents of 
city† 
Crude rate/100,000 
residents (95% CI) 
Age-adjusted rate/ 
100,000 residents 
(95% CI)‡ 
Total 996 12.3 (11.5–13.1)  12.6 (11.8-13.4) 
Age group, y 
  0–4  224 (22)  6.7 40.9 (35.6–46.3)  –
  <2  128  (13)  2.7 58.1  (48.0–68.1)  –
  2–4  96  (10)  4.0 29.4  (23.8–35.9)  –
  5–24  297 (30)  27.4 13.3 (11.8–14.8)  –
  5–17  197  (20)  17.4 13.9  (12.0–15.9)  –
  18-24  100  (10)  10.0 12.3  (9.9–14.7)  –
  25–64  419 (42)  54.0 9.6 (8.6–10.5)  –
  25–49  245  (25)  39.5 7.6  (6.7–8.6)  –
  50–64  174  (17)  14.5 14.8  (12.6–16.9)  –
 > 65 56 (6)  14.5 6.0 (4.5–7.7)  –
Sex§ 
  M  468 (47)  47.4 12.2 (11.1–13.3)  12.5 (11.4–13.7) 
  F  526 (53)  52.6 12.3 (11.3–13.4)  12.9 (11.9–14.1) 
Poverty status§¶ 
  High-poverty area  498 (50)  32.7 18.8 (17.1–20.4)  18.4 (16.8–20.1) 
  Medium-poverty area  323 (33)  40.9 9.7 (8.7–10.8)  10.1 (9.1–11.3) 
  Low-poverty area  172 (17)  26.4 8.0 (6.8–9.2)  8.9 (7.6–10.4) 
*CI, confidence interval.  
†Percentage of all residents of the city in each category. Estimates based on 2000 US Census data (11).
‡Direct age standardization was performed by using weights based on 2000 US Census data (11). Median age for hospitalized patients was 23 y and for 
all city residents was 34 y. 
§2 persons were missing sex data; 3 persons were missing poverty data. 
¶Neighborhood poverty was based on the tertiles of percentage of residents living <200% of the federal poverty level according to the 2000 US Census 
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demic (9), active case-based surveillance was initially im-
plemented because little was known about the severity of 
this novel strain of H1N1, and public health ofﬁ  cials were 
concerned on the basis of initial media reports from Mex-
ico. To learn more about the severity of illness, DOHMH 
focused on surveillance of hospitalized cases and deaths. 
Surveillance and reporting requirements were modiﬁ  ed 
when it became clear that circulation of pandemic (H1N1) 
2009 was citywide, but surveillance for deaths and hospi-
talized cases continued to help ofﬁ  cials assess the severity 
and at-risk groups for pandemic (H1N1) 2009, and the re-
sulting information helped inform DOHMH planning and 
response to this new virus.
Approximately half of hospitalized patients lived in 
a high-poverty neighborhood; this association between 
poverty and severe illness has been reported for seasonal 
inﬂ  uenza (14). Our ﬁ  nding of the association between 
young age and severe illness is consistent with other stud-
ies (15–20), and the greater proportion of persons 0–17 
years of age in low-income neighborhoods in NYC (21) 
may contribute to this distribution. Other possible expla-
nations include higher attack rates among residents liv-
ing in crowded housing, or that residents with known risk 
conditions in high-poverty neighborhoods may be less 
likely to receive early treatment or prophylaxis, given 
that the proportion of people without personal doctors is 
higher in high-poverty areas relative to low-poverty areas 
(20% vs. 11%) (21). In addition, the proportion of unin-
sured persons in low-income areas (18%) is higher than 
the proportion in high-income areas (9%), according to 
NYC’s Community Health Survey from 2008 (21). Future 
studies should assess poverty status and its relationship to 
severe inﬂ  uenza illness.
Our analysis had several limitations. By limiting testing 
to those patients who had positive inﬂ  uenza A test results 
(unless patients were in the ICU), our surveillance approach 
systematically undercounted hospitalized patients with pan-
demic (H1N1) 2009. Although this enabled us to monitor 
hospitalization trends, we most likely do not have a com-
plete count of cases. Published studies have found a wide 
range of results for the sensitivity of rapid inﬂ  uenza testing 
for the pandemic (H1N1) 2009 strain (17%–70%) (22–25). 
Applying the published range of sensitivities to our results 
would suggest that the true number of hospitalized patients 
in NYC ranged from 1,400 to 6,000, which is 1.5–7.0× 
higher than those for cases detected and conﬁ  rmed. Also, 
because of the limited amount of data collected on all pa-
tients, we were unable to examine variables at the individual 
level; such data (for example, having a primary care physi-
cian and insurance status) may have modiﬁ  ed the ﬁ  ndings 
regarding the relationship between poverty and severe ill-
ness. Lastly, demographic and economic information was 
from 2000, and changes may have occurred.
Surveillance data from the spring outbreak informed 
NYC planning and response to pandemic (H1N1) 2009 
during the 2009–10 fall and winter inﬂ  uenza season. Be-
cause young children represented a large proportion of 
hospitalized cases and because of the role children likely 
play in transmission, NYC created a school-based vaccina-
tion program for elementary and middle schoolchildren and 
vaccinated all children who had parental consent. In the fall 
of 2009, >60 inﬂ  uenza diagnostic and treatment communi-
ty based centers were established for persons with ILI who 
did not have a primary care physician; an advice hotline, 
staffed by nurses, was created to answer questions and help 
connect NYC residents to care. Antiviral medications were 
made available to those who could not afford them, and 
points of distribution provided the vaccine free of charge to 
New Yorkers, initially targeting those who had risk factors 
for severe pandemic (H1N1) 2009 as identiﬁ  ed in NYC and 
elsewhere (15–20,26,27).
DOHMH has continued to use emergency room and 
outpatient syndromic surveillance systems to follow trends 
in inﬂ  uenza-like activity citywide. We also requested pas-
sive reporting of inﬂ  uenza hospitalizations by all city hos-
pitals and collected some data on clinical status and risk 
factors. Finally, to more effectively monitor the clinical 
and epidemiologic characteristic of pandemic (H1N1) 2009 
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Figure 2. Age-adjusted rates of hospitalization for conﬁ  rmed  or 
probable pandemic (H1N1) 2009, by neighborhood poverty level, 
New York, New York, USA, April 24–July 7, 2009. Direct age 
standardization was performed by using weights from the 2000 US 
Census (11). Of 996 total patients, 993 had complete poverty data 
available. Star represents location of high school A.RESEARCH
during the fall and winter seasons, we established a senti-
nel hospital surveillance program at 5 sites where active 
surveillance and inﬂ  uenza testing were conducted on any 
patient with fever and respiratory syndromes. Collection 
of isolates from sentinel hospitals and active laboratory 
surveillance also allowed circulating inﬂ  uenza subtypes, 
as well as antiviral resistance, to be monitored. Surveil-
lance guided and informed the NYC response to pandemic 
(H1N1) 2009, and this experience will help NYC plan a 
response to future epidemics. 
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